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Damages for Potential Residuals of
Brain Injuries
Jerry B. Kraig* and Henry A. Hentemann**
T HE HUMAN BRAIN in the adult male weighs about 49 ounces,
and the female brain is even lighter.1 Yet this semigelati-
nous, incompressible organ enclosed completely within the bony
skull 2 is the main part of the complex nervous system3 and is
probably the most highly developed structure in the universe.'
The seriousness of damage to the head and resultant impairment
of the body functions has been given proper cognizance as evi-
denced by substantial jury awards.5 Injury to the brain, how-
ever, may not only result in immediate damage to the body func-
tion but may result in damage that will be experienced at a
remote future time.
Trauma to the brain may be followed within days, weeks or
months by the appearance of such complaints as headaches,
dizziness, especially on change of position, irritability, inability to
work or concentrate, easy perspiring and emotional liability. Per-
sonality changes can also result. A previously healthy, reliable
worker can become complaining and unreliable. In other cases
memory loss, increased sensitivity to alcohol, sometimes chronic
alcoholism and serious behavior irregularities are encountered.6
These residual effects are often termed post-traumatic sequelae,
post-traumatic syndrome or traumatic encephalopathy, 7 and they
range from the persistent headache and personality change to
the more spectacular convulsive disorder known as post-
*B.A., Kent State University, Senior at Cleveland-Marshall Law School.
** B.A., John Carroll University, Senior at Cleveland-Marshall Law School.
1 Malory, Legal Anatomy and Surgery 346 (1930).
2 Gordy, Anatomy and Physiology of the Brain, 2 Trauma (1) 7 (June,
1960).
3 Webster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary Unabridged, Second Edi-
tion (1958).
4 Kety, Cerebral Circulation and Metabolism, 2 Cyclopedia of Medicine 397
(1962).
5 See 5 Belli, Modern Trials 149 (1960); Oleck, Damages to Persons and
Property 966.81-.85 (1961); Oleck, Cases on Damages 546 (1962); Kelley,
Recent Head Damage Awards, 10 Clev.-Mar. L. R. 2 (May, 1960).
6 Adams, Physical Damages 863 (14th ed. 1958).
7 Lapham, Long Range Pathological Changes Following Trauma To The
Head, The Head 68 (1956).
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traumatic epilepsy. This residual and potential effect of brain
damage is the difficult problem in the assessment of damage
awards.
From a medico-legal point of view the most perplexing
problem and the one most commonly encountered in the court-
room is the post-traumatic syndrome,8 which is the resulting
headaches, dizziness and/or mental and personality changes. The
term itself has been defined to mean "a chronic defect in the
organization of mental function caused specifically by damage
to the brain at the time of a head injury and persistent after the
post-traumatic state has cleared up." 9 The assessment of dam-
ages for these residual effects can be as arbitrary as the jury
may decide.
In Barango v. E. L. Hedstrom,10 at the time of trial, six years
after the accident, plaintiff still had dizzy spells, floating sensa-
tions, and dulling of his motor powers in conjunction with
constant pain in his neck and back. Evidence was speculative
as to the subjective complaints of headaches and dizziness. Spe-
cials amounted to $4,000. The verdict of $75,000 was held to be
not excessive. In Harris v. Lambert" specials were again around
$4,000. The injuries primarily consisted of permanent brain
injury, persistent headaches which would probably last for plain-
tiff's lifetime, personality change and tinnitus. Here the verdict
was $47,369. And again in Barker v. Reedy 12 the woman plain-
tiff sustained, among other injuries, post-concussional syndrome
primarily consisting of headaches and blackouts. Plaintiff under-
went a brain operation in hope of alleviating the headache
condition but achieving ony temporary relief. Medical testimony
stated that the headaches would be permanent. Plaintiff's hus-
band spent $765 for medical and hospital bills and domestic help.
The jury returned a verdict of only $500 for the injured plaintiff
and $1,000 for her husband. Subsequently, however, a new trial
was granted.
These cases illustrate the capricious latitude assumed by
juries in awarding damages based on primarily subjective re-
siduals. The obvious difficulty confronting the jury is in dis-
8 Id.
9 Bochner, Psychiatric Evaluation of the Post Traumatic Syndrome of
Head Injury, The Head 220 (1956).
10 12 Ill. App. 2d 118, 138 N. E. 2d 829 (1956).
11 131 Cal. App. 2d 751, 281 P. 2d 292 (1955).
12 167 Pa. Super. 222, 74 P. 2d 533 (1950).
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tinguishing the neurotic or malingerer or the individual desiring
to collect insurance, from the truly defective individual, as the
syndrome consists of subjective complaints with no clinical evi-
dence of presently existing brain damage.
Experience has taught the medical profession the length of
disability due to a bone fracture, and that the disability following
an operative repair of a certain organ should not exceed a certain
length of time. But in cases of head injuries, similar calculations
are not possible. It is true that it is approximately known just
how long it will take for a fractured skull to heal; yet concerning
the extent and permanent effects of any associated injury to the
brain, statistics are of little help. Only a careful study of the
neurological physical signs which the patients present will allow
any kind of estimate of this.1 3 For this reason it is very im-
portant to study the individual's antecedent history. Had he any
previous neurotic illnesses or psychotic episodes, were there any
previous incidents with or without consciousness, and what was
his reaction to them? Has his domestic life been peaceful; has
he had economic security? What are the individual's habits in
regard to alcohol and tobacco, and what other diseases has he
had especially in relation to the nervous system? If the symptoms
appeared after the accident, when did they first make themselves
manifest; 14 and if the injury includes damage to the mental func-
tion, a detailed history of post-traumatic amnesia is very im-
portant. 5 Too much emphasis cannot be laid on the value of a
good history.' 6
Damage to the brain which has resulted in an impairment of
mental functioning manifests itself in several ways. The injured
party may have disturbances in his ability to speak. This is of
two types. One may know what he wants to say but cannot find
the word he is looking for. This is technically called "aphasia."
Or the individual cannot get the right organization of words, so
that no matter how hard he tries, his conversation, his grouping
of words, fails to make sense. This is technically called "dys-
phasia." 17
13 Reed-Emerson, Relation Between Injury and Disease 384 (1938).
14 Brock, Injuries to the Brain and Spinal Cord and Their Coverings 14 (4th
ed. 1960).
15 Bochner, op. cit. supra, n. 9 at 222.
16 Shapiro, Methods of Diagnosis in Head Injuries, 2 Trauma (1) 23 (June,
1960).
17 See: Kings Indiana Billiard Company v. Winters, 123 Ind. App. 110, 106
N. E. 2d 713 (1952), where a residual of apasia along with other injuries
resulted in a $65,000 award.
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There is also "acalculia," which is difficulty in calculation
even of simple sums. With this symptom care must be used in
evaluating what part is due to head injury and what part is due
to just the characteristics of the particular person. There is a
number of intelligent people who have difficulty in performing
the simple mathematics of everyday living such as correctly
adding their grocery bills or balancing their checkbooks. Con-
sequently, investigation should be made into this particular
individual's history to determine whether he has always been
a very accurate calculator but one who is now unable to calcu-
late. The importance of this aspect is exemplified in a case where
the occupation of the plaintiff requires an analytical mind. In
evaluating the effects of this type of residual, the inability to
perform such an occupation is paramount in assessing proper
damages. In the case of Lukasiewicz v. Haddad18 an award of
$100,000 for brain damage which rendered a 37 year old plaintiff
unable to continue in his profession as a chemist was affirmed.
He was unable to rationalize in a scientific manner as before the
accident. His salary was $505 a month as a chemist, and the
injury left him with 75 per cent total disability and 100 per cent
disability to perform his old job.
There are also other subtle manifestations of an impairment
in an injured party's mental functioning, demonstrated either by
his inability to recognize familiar objects, usually limited to a
few objects, or by his inability to use instruments he has been
accustomed to using. The latter is known as "apraxia."
One of the most tragic potential injuries which could result
from a serious head injury is traumatic epilepsy. "Next to can-
cer, epilepsy is about the worst condition you could possibly
have." 19
Not every convulsive disorder is epilepsy. 20 The mere term
epilepsy is usually applied to the idiopathic type of epilepsy.
These are convulsive attacks without recognizable cause, which
normally begin in childhood or adolescence. In childhood they
may appear as petit mal epilepsy, which may be very mild and
oftentimes undiagnosed. They may be manifested as a peculiar
movement, attacks of faintness, dizziness or sensation of falling.21
18 24 N. J. Super. 399, 94 A. 2d 504 (1953).
19 Averbach, The Problems of Traumatic Epilepsy as Viewed by the Trial
Lawyer, Trial and Tort Trends 60 (1957).
20 Abbott, Post-Traumatic Epilepsy, 2 Trauma (1), 100 (June, 1960).
21 McBride, Disability Evaluation 643 (5th ed. 1953).
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Therefore, even when convulsive disorders follow trauma, a me-
ticulous investigation should be made of the childhood disposition
and habits.
Diseased conditions of the brain may also cause a convulsive
disorder, which is not epilepsy. Some of these are syphilis,
hereditary brain defects, parasitic diseases, brain abscess, menin-
gitis, encephalitis and brain tumors, 22 brain swelling and even
tuberculosis. 23 Some systemic diseases such as toxemia of
pregnancy, uremia and hyperinsulinism are also accompanied by
convulsions. 24 Exogenous intoxications may also produce them.
25
The importance of a thorough check into the medical history is
obvious in determining a causal relation between trauma and a
resulting convulsive disorder.
Traumatic epilepsy, however, is a convulsive disorder pre-
cipitated by an injury to the head.20 Traumatic epilepsy may be
caused by a simple concussion, but this is only in a very small
percentage of cases.2 7 Usually it implies an injury to the head
of such magnitude as to produce an unconscious state of one
hour or more in duration.
28
Traumatic epilepsy may produce any type of epileptic seiz-
ure: grand ma--severe convulsions and loss of consciousness;
akinetic-falling without jerking of the extremities; petit mal-
momentary "blackout" but without convulsions or prolonged loss
of consciousness; Jacksonian-involves only half of the body or
extremity or a small area without loss of consciousness; sensory
-alterations in all senses, including sense of taste, smell, hearing
or vision; or psychomotor-brief unconscious states with auto-
matic movements which seem voluntary, masked epilepsy.29
The first onset of traumatic epilepsy usually occurs months
or even years after the injury. The average time interval is
usually from six months to three years.8 0 Although the actual
mechanism which is concerned with the production of traumatic
22 Id.
23 Pollock, Trauma and Disease of the Nervous System 311 (2d ed. 1941).
24 McBride, op. cit. supra n. 21.
25 Pollock, op. cit. supra n. 23.
26 Abbott, op. cit. supra n. 20.
27 4 Lawyer's Medical Cyclopedia 385 (1960).
28 Abbott, op. cit. supra n. 20.
29 Id.
80 Id.
Sept., 1962
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epileptic seizures is unknown,3 1 there is speculation that it is
caused by a small hemorrhage at the time of trauma, which is
later repaired by nature with the formation of a scar.32 There-
fore, for a well-founded diagnosis of traumatic epilepsy, the
attacks should not occur within the first three months following
the injury.3 3 The exact time as to when epilepsy will manifest
itself cannot be categorically determined. 34 An extreme example
of this is an interval of twenty-seven years between the head
injury and the first epileptic seizure.35 However, in delayed
traumatic epilepsy there is normally a symptom which persists
during the interval between the time when the injury was sus-
tained and when the first seizure is experienced. 36 This can be
in the form of paralysis or mere dizziness.
The existing possibilities of delayed traumatic epilepsy may
be medically inserted into evidence in order to be assessed in
the damages.3 7 In Fort Wayne Transit, Inc., v. Shomo 3s an award
of $15,000 for skill fractures and lacerations sustained by a 6
year old child who would probably suffer in later years from
convulsive disorder and epilepsy was held not excessive. In
this case a doctor testified, "I think it would be fair to state that
there is objective evidence of permanent brain damage which
may very well later manifest in her by having convulsions." To
establish the probability of such a future happening, the doctor
testified that from similar wounds (as plaintiff's) during the
war, 75 per cent developed some form of convulsive disorder.
Also 75 per cent of the people with a similar abnormality will at
some time develop focal epilepsy. Such evidence is not con-
sidered to be an injection of passion provocation designed to
prejudice the jury against the defendant and, thereby, result in
an excessive verdict.39
31 Elvidge, The Post-Traumatic Convulsive and Allied States, op. cit. supra
n. 14 at 291.
32 4 Lawyer's Medical Cyclopedia 385 (1960).
33 Averbach, op. cit. supra n. 19 at 52.
34 See: Tables of Frequency, Elvidge, op. cit. supra n. 31 at 288 and 295.
35 Abbott, op. cit. supra n. 20.
36 McBride, op. cit. supra n. 21.
37 Potter v. Empress Theatre Company, 91 Cal. App. 2d 4, 204 P. 2d 120
(1949). In this case, medical testimony that because of injury to the brain
there was "a good possibility" that convulsions and epilepsy might develop
later was sufficient to sustain a large award.
38 143 N. E. 2d 431 (Ind. 1957).
39 Prizio v. Penachio, 146 Conn. 452, 152 A. 2d 507 (1959).
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In Hayward v. Yost4° there was expert medical testimony
to the effect that plaintiff may later develop severe headaches
and be afflicted with Jacksonian-type seizures and possibly even
partial paralysis of certain types. A verdict of $10,000 to a minor
plaintiff and $3,605 (which included $605 for hospital care and
medical bills) to plaintiff's parents was not excessive.
An award of $24,500 for injuries to a 4 year old boy with
$1,868.45 in specials was held not excessive, where a definite
brain injury was shown and it was reasonably probable that
there would be resulting petit mal attacks of epilepsy."1
Once the petit mal epilepsy condition is existent, there is
even the further possibility that it may become greater in de-
gree. In such a case, there is need for an evaluation of this po-
tentiality. In Melford v. Gaus & Brown Construction Company,
Inc.,42 a doctor testified that the plaintiff's condition was petit
mal epilepsy which "can eventually become a full blown epi-
lepsy with convulsions." Although the medical evidence con-
sisted mainly of electroencephalographic tests, a verdict of $20,-
000 was sustained, holding the medical testimony "not specu-
lative" and sufficient for a jury to infer that there was "reason-
able medical certainty" that the epilepsy would grow progres-
sively worse.
When traumatic epilepsy can reasonably be anticipated, the
evaluation of compensating damages should not omit the non-
medical effects of this condition. The epileptic will not be able
to carry on in his normal way of living. Epilepsy will have an
effect upon his marriageability4 3 and his legal rights to operate
a motor vehicle. 44 An epileptic convulsive seizure is a potential
cause of bone fractures in other parts of the body. 45 Also there
are many things the epileptic should not be able to do alone.
Some of these are swimming, bathing and sleeping (which might
result in suffocation). And the term of life expectancy is short-
ened in the epileptic.46
40 72 Idaho 415, 242 P. 2d 971 (1952).
41 Prizio v. Penachio, supra n. 39.
42 17 Ill. App. 2d 497, 151 N. E. 2d 129, 66 A. L. R. 2d 528 (1958).
43 19 states have sterilization laws specifically applicable for epileptics; 17
states forbid their marriage (6 of these make marriage a crime). Time
Magazine, Dec. 20, 1954, p. 47.
44 2 Gray, Attorney's Textbook of Medicine 1067 (3d ed. 1961).
45 Moritz, Pathology of Trauma 350 (2d ed. 1954).
46 2 Gray, op. cit. supra n. 44.
Sept., 1962
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In addition to these, there is the attitude of society which
oftentimes has a greater effect upon the epileptic's economic
condition than do the seizures themselves. For the epileptic is
not accepted on the same level as the normal individual.4 7
Realization by one who has sustained a severe head injury
that he may be subjected to convulsive seizures and all the as-
sociated socio-economic implications can lead to a state of mental
anxiety. Such a state of mind is often termed post-traumatic
neurosis and could be considered as a compensable damage. It
is not uncommon for a doctor to indicate to his patient the con-
ceivable implications which might ultimately result from their
particular injury. Notice of such possibilities may cause mental
anguish to the patient. The patient may constantly worry as to
if and when the first seizure will strike him, and his normal way
of living will necessarily be changed. Such mental anguish,
being a proximate result of the head injury, may be the basis
for a mental suffering claim whether or not the condition actually
develops, and therefore should be assessed in the damages. 48
The case of Ferrara v. Galluchi49 allowed a recovery of
$15,000 for mental anguish which plaintiff had to endure from
the knowledge of possible cancer. The significance of such a de-
cision can be readily appreciated when considering the future
effects of head injury. This would mean that a warning or in-
dication from a doctor in regard to potential residual effects from
the injury could establish a basis for a claim for mental suf-
fering. In many cases the mental anxiety may be far greater
than the actual resulting effects.
The importance of proper assessment for head injuries is
clearly indicated by the nature of the injury and the tragic
effects of the potential residuals. There is reasonable certainty
that where there is a fracture of the skull, the violence which
was sufficient to fracture bones was "sufficiently great to dam-
age a soft organ such as the brain." 50
Damages for future pain and suffering must have a
basis in the evidence submitted to support the claim; there-
fore, pain and suffering which are merely possible and specu-
47 Id. at 1069.
48 6 Curr. Med. for Attorneys (24) p. 6 (May, 1959).
49 176 N. Y. S. 2d 996, 152 N. E. 2d 249 (1959).
50 Adelson, Anatomic Findings in Acute Head Injuries, The Head 48 (1956).
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lative or conjectural are not to be considered in assessing
the damages. 5 1
An excellent example is the case of Figlar v. Gorden.5 2 Specials
amounted to $4,383.50, for injuries consisting of a compound
depressed fracture of the skull with laceration of the brain and
destruction of much brain tissue, and a badly comminuted frac-
ture of the right tibia and fibula. A verdict of $40,000 for a 17
year old plaintiff was held to be not excessive. On the issue of
the possibility of epilepsy, the court stated:
While the evidence would not justify an award of damages
based upon the occurrence of epilepsy in the future because
it went no further than to deal with this as a possible re-
sult, the danger that it might ensue was a present fact and
the jury were entitled to take into consideration anxiety
resulting therefrom.
The Figlar case also illustrates the importance of valid medi-
cal testimony to substantiate the burden of evidence. It would
not be sufficient to show mere possibility. The court requires a
reasonable probability in order to sustain the proof.5 3
In Arkansas City v. Payne5 4 the court said that the future
pain for which a plaintiff may recover is limited to that which
the evidence shows it is reasonable to expect. In Southland
Broadcasting Company v. Tracy55 plaintiff suffered a basal frac-
ture of the skull with resulting damage to brain tissue. Plain-
tiff's physician was of the opinion that epilepsy would probably
result in future years. Medical bills were around $1,000. Plain-
tiff's salary was $55 per week. The court sustained a verdict
of $25,000.
"Is likely to cause people to have convulsions or epileptic
fits" was held sufficient to constitute reasonable certainty in
Kuemmel v. Vradenburg.56 In this case the court held:
The word likely has been held to be sufficient to give that
measure of certainty required for future damage. We hold
that convulsions and epileptic seizures are not disassociated
with pain and mental anguish and are conditions which
51 15 Am. Jur. Damages 484 (1938).
52 133 Conn. 577, 53 A. 2d 645 (1947).
53 Fort Wayne Transit, Inc. v. Shomo, supra n. 38.
54 80 Kan. 353, 102 P. 781 (1909).
55 210 Miss. 836, 50 So. 2d 572 (1951).
56 239 S. W. 2d 869 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951).
Sept., 1962
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under the evidence, will probably result from the brain
injury.
Even "in all probability" has been held to be equivalent to
reasonable certainty. 57
In Thompson v. Anderman5 s the case came to trial in a little
less than two years after the accident. The plaintiff had not yet
had an epileptic seizure. The attorney for the plaintiff intro-
duced medical evidence to establish the probability of epilepsy.
One doctor testified that most seizures following head injury are
going to develop within one year, but that doctors are always
worried about seizures developing up to three years after injury.
On cross-examination the medical experts for the defense would
make no certain statement that the plaintiff would not develop
epilepsy. Judgment for $54,000 was affirmed.
In attempting to aid juries in their decisions as to the
amount of damages to be awarded for future pain and suffering,
various methods have been devised.5 9 However, in attempting
to assess a potentiality, these methods of calculation would not
generally be applicable because of the uncertainty of the starting
date and the degree of disability that will result. Also, the
statistical factors concerning frequency with which these po-
tential injuries will occur are far from approaching a high de-
gree of certainty. However, since potential residuals are com-
pensable damages, juries have a wide range of discretion in as-
sessing the amount.
An interesting theory 0 has been advanced that, due to the
highly speculative nature of this potential injury and its serious-
ness if it should occur, large awards in essence are representa-
tive of an insurance against this injury. Therefore, rather than
grant actual compensation for traumatic epilepsy, a policy of in-
surance should be issued together with the award for the pres-
57 King v. Neller, 228 Mich. 15, 199 N. W. 674 (1924).
58 59 N. M. 400, 285 P. 2d 507 (1955).
59 For a discussion of various methods see Botta v. Brunner, 26 N. J. 82,
138 A. 2d 713 (1958); Southern Truck Leasing Company v. Manieri, 325
S. W. 2d 912 (Tex. Civ. App.) (1959); Braddock v. Seaboard Air Line R.R.
Company, 80 S. 2d 662 (Fla. 1955); Imperial Oil, Limited v. Drlik, 234 F.
2d 4 (6th Cir. 1956), cert. den., 352 U. S. 941 (1957). As to the per diem
theory see generally, 2 Averbach, Handling Accident Cases, Sec. 2:235
(1958). For a discussion on the pros and cons of the computation technique
see 1960 Wash. U. L. Q. 302 (June, 1960); Hauth, Per Diem Argument of
Pain and Suffering Damages, elsewhere in this issue of this Law Review
(Sept. 1962).
60 Abbott, op. cit. supra n. 20 at 132.
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ent, existing injuries. If epileptic convulsions should occur, the
policy becomes effective; if not, the only loss to the defendant
would be the policy premium, which would certainly be far
smaller in amount.
Nevertheless, as a method for calculating an award for po-
tential injuries is as difficult a problem as determining the prob-
ability of the injury occurring, and as these two speculative
factors both are to be considered by the jury, it should be with-
in the power of the jury to grant a present award and thus to
conclude the matter forever.
11Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1962
